Containing Muslim Extremism and
Radicalism[1]
Wan Mohd Nor Wan Daud
Professor
at Institute of the Malay World and Civilization (ATMA)
National
University of Malaysia (UKM), 43600 Bangi, Selangor Malaysia
(wanmn65@yahoo.com)
ABSTRACT
Artikel ini menyebut bahwa perang, kekejaman, radikalisme dan
ekstrimisme disebabkan
oleh banyak faktor seperti; sosio-ekonomi, politik dan etnis, meskipun ada juga
disebabkan oleh komunitas agama. Namun, faktor internal seperti peran
pendidikan agama, sangat penting dalam
memahami radikalisme agama dan ekstrimisme, termasuk di sebagian kalangan
Muslim. Artikel ini juga memaparkan sifat ganda religiusitas Islam di Asia. Rekam sejarah perlakuan Muslim,
menunjukkan bahwa aspek metodologis dan doktrin tertentu terhadap pendidikan
Islam mungkin telah memberi kontribusi pandangan dan prilaku ekstrim. Penulis
menawarkan rekomendasi spesifik dan praktis yang melibatkan faktor eksternal
dan internal secara signifikan yang akan mengurangi fenomena ekstrimisme di
kalangan umat Islam, khususnya di Asia.
Kata
Kunci:
Muslim Ekstrim, Radikalisasi, Fenomena prilaku Muslim ekstrim di Asia
Introduction
This conference, dealing with certain
aspects of Islam and the socio-political developments of Muslims in Asia, is
indeed important and timely—because in a globalized world, Asian developments
are linked to developments in other parts of the world as well. Similar
conferences should also be organised on other religions and on secular
ideologies and their relationship to international relations and security as
international tensions have been justified in the name of God, ideology, king,
and country.
These factors were not, and are not used
in strict isolation. Often times, several factors were, and are involved in
different orders of influence. For example, the colonization of Latin America
and large parts of Africa and Asia from the 16th century was
perpetrated in the name of the King
(country) and God, while the First and Second World Wars and the Korean and
Vietnam Wars can be attributed to ideological and national causes, in which God
played a much smaller role, if at all. The Balkan ethnic cleansing, where the
victims were largely Muslims and where the perpetrators were mostly orthodox
Christians, was neither motivated by ideological nor national reasons, but more
by ethnic and socio-economic ones. The mass genocide in the Christian majority state of Rwanda is largely
tribal; the Ugandan civil war is primarily due to Christian religious radicalism,
the mass killings of the Muslims in the Ivory Coast were committed by Christian
and Indigenous groups, while the exact reverse is true in southern Sudan. The
two decade old Sri Lankan civil war between the Hindu-Tamil minority separatist
group---some of whose methods are quite similar to the Muslim
terrorists--against Buddhist-Sinhalese majority is driven by ethnic and
religious factors (GlobalSecurity.org. 2008) .
Diversity and Unity of
Asian Muslims
Muslims in Asia are divided into three
categories: the Majority (Malaysia, Indonesia, Pakistan, Brunei), the
Indigenous minority (Singapore, India, Thailand, Philippines, China), and the
Immigrant minority (Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Australia), each with its own
peculiarities, reflecting the rich diversity of global Muslim thought, cultures
and political experiences. The overwhelming majority of Southeast Asian Muslims
adhere to the Ash’arite theological framework and the Shafi’ite legal school;
compared for example to Indo-Pakistani Muslims who are Maturidite and Hanafite. Both groups have had different political
experiences with Western colonialists and have chartered different political
frameworks. Despite these differences, Asian Muslims---like their
co-religionists everywhere---are unified with each other through certain basic
aspects of the worldview and ethical and legal principles of Islam. A most
noteworthy indicator is that one of the most comprehensive and authoritative
work on the Creed of Islam by the 12th century central Asian
Maturidite theologian, Abu Hafs Najmuddin al-Nasafi was translated into Malay
and commented upon and widely read in the Malay-Indonesia world till at least
the mid-19th century.[2]
Beside this, Asian Muslims also possess a sense of ummatic solidarity which is further facilitated by an efficient modern
communication technology.
These unifying elements and a sense of
ummatic solidarity explain why gross
atrocities against Muslims and the prolonged deprivation of their homeland and
ancestral rights--for example in Palestine, Southern Thailand, and the
Philippines—the discrimination against fellow Muslims in other parts of the
world, and any efforts at denigrating or belittling the fundamental aspects,
pillars, and institutions of Islam---such as on the Qur’an and the Prophet
Muhammad---will naturally elicit responses from Muslims everywhere. The varying
degrees of intensity and expression of these responses depend on the
educational level, socio-political organization and leadership of each Muslim
community.
Atrocities against Muslims and attacks on
Islam are certainly not recent phenomena as witnessed during the centuries of
Christian crusades and the Spanish Inquisition (in which the Jews also
suffered, albeit on a relatively much smaller scale) that followed the
colonization of Muslim lands. In addition, attacks on various aspects of Islam
have been carried out in the writings of numerous Christian missionaries,
Western orientalists, political scientists, sociologists and journalists,
notwithstanding many great contributions some of them have made. Edward Said’s Orientalism (1978) and Covering Islam (1981) are just two of
the most popular expositions of these aspects.
Muslim
Moderates and Extremists
Extremism (ghuluw) is a vice in the Islamic worldview and ethics, while
moderation (wasatiyyah), which has
been universally practiced throughout its history—including in Muslim Asia, is
a praiseworthy virtue (fadhilah).
Presently, the terms Muslim moderates, fundamentalists, and radicals are
interpreted from the dominant Western perspective, which generally seems to
equate secularized and westernized Muslims as moderates and inclusive;
traditional Muslims as fundamentalists and exclusive; and all Muslims who
oppose Western and non-Islamic intellectual and geo-political hegemony as
radicals and even militants. The largest majority of Muslims are moderates—even
if some of their traditional religious views and social-legal practices are not
acceptable to modern secularists, or even when they have to resort to military
means to defend their homeland and their basic human rights. In their struggles
against various Western colonial forces from the 16th century CE
onwards, these moderate Muslims derived their inspiration and strength from
Islam and its military aspects of Jihad, but did not wage wars of terror such
as the intentional killing of non-military population, the destruction of
non-military institutions and buildings, and suicide bombings—as recently
employed by militant extremists.
Briefly, it is instructive to note that
throughout most of its history, Muslims have succeeded in intellectually
rejecting the extremists of various philosophical, theological, mystical and
political orientations. Many eminent Muslim scholars such as Abdul Qahir
al-Baghdadi (d.1037) in al-Firaq bayn
al-Firaq, Abu Hamid al-Ghazzali (d. 1111)
in Tahafut al-Falasifah, Ihya Ulumiddin, and Munqidh minal Dhalal, and Taj al-Din al-Shahrastani (d.1153) in Kitab al-Milal wal Nihal, and in the Malay-Indonesian world, Nuruddin
al-Raniri (d. 1658) in Hujjat al-Siddiq an daf’ Zindiq, have
identified many of these groups and their doctrines. Even the Khawarij and
Batini Assassins---the Hashahshiyun---who managed to create tremendous
mischief, were finally intellectually defeated and made socially insignificant.
The
recent atrocities committed by Muslims as recently as the last Sept 21st
2008 Marriott Hotel bombing in Islamabad (although no Muslim group has yet
claimed responsibility has been blamed by the Pakistan Interior minister, Tehrik e-Taleban e-Pakistan (TTP), on a
militant group suspected to have links with it al-Qaedah (The Times 2008)
---are largely a modern phenomena, and can be attributed to many interlinked
external and internal factors.
Contemporary
Muslim extremism can be contained and intellectually defeated and socially
ostracized if the external and internal causes can be properly addressed.
External factors
By external factors, we mean certain
long-standing problems, such as that of Palestine, where Muslim holy and
historic places and symbols are grossly affected, where many of their fellow
Muslims and Christians were oppressed, and where international laws, which have
been vigorously and systematically applied against other offending
nations—rightly or otherwise---have been consistently ignored in this case. The
half a century of displacement from their homeland and the constant humiliation
and suffering will naturally elicit a deep-seated resentment and anger within
the psyche of these generations, not only against the direct perpetrators, but also
their allies. This state of mind shows
not only the utter disregard for all international laws and conventions, but
also for themselves. Hopelessness breeds fearlessness, not courage.
These factors that contribute to the rise
of modern Muslim radicalism in the Middle East are also found, to a large
extent---although not with a similar degree---in other parts of the world where
this radicalism rears its contemptuous head.
The loss of ancestral rights and privileges and the socio-economic
deprivation and political alienation within new modern nation-states are
evidenced in the decades-old conflicts in Kashmir, India, Southern Thailand,
Southern Philippines, and Central Asia. The less publicized nature of the
conflicts in these regions does not negate an almost similar sense of
desperation for group existential survival against oppressive national
governments.
Another key external factor that has
contributed to the deepening Muslim cynicism and distrust towards some Western
powers and their allies, especially in the age of electronic communication
revolution, is Islamophobia and the
related double-standard attitude towards Islam and traditional Muslims. Muslims
notice that the while the Western media generally treats most non-Western
religions and their cultural manifestations as positive reflections of the rich
diversity of the human tapestry, a similar stance has not been shown towards
Islam. While in all Muslim countries---with Malaysia as one of the better
examples---non-Muslims were and are given the rights to practice their
religion, in liberal Western countries, who are championing global human
rights, multiculturalism and tolerance, Muslim religious freedom is being
restricted under various pretexts. Repeated incidences of Islamophobia and the
double standards on Islam and Muslims will not only be used as fodder by Muslim
extremists and militants to recruit new members worldwide. Leaders of Islamic
countries have regularly expressed concerns regarding Islamophobia, the latest
being the statements of the Foreign Minister of Malaysia in Washington on Sept
25th 2008.[3]
The awareness of the discrimination against Muslims has also reached higher
levels of Western leadership. For
example, on 9th-10th Oct 2007, the Organization for
Security and Co-Operation in Europe (OSCE) organized a conference on
discrimination and intolerance towards Muslims in Cordoba attended by high
level officers from 56 member states from Europe and Central Asia as well as
non-governmental organizations (AFP 2007).
However, I concur with scholars like Bassam
Tibbi and others, that attacks and critics on the politicitization of Islam
should not be equated with Islamophobia, although he and many Western scholars
only regard the non-politicization of Islam as one that is publicly secular and
free from its Sha’riah obligations (Tibbi 2006: 70-74).
Internal factors
However, the internal factors in the rise
of modern Muslim radicalism are more significant—which help to explain the
inability to control the negative effects of the deplorable external
challenges: 1) Detraditionalization and demysticization of Islamic discourse
and ethics, and 2) Loss of proper and legitimate religious and political
authorities.
Traditional Islamic education, which was interpreted and practiced
through an authoritative sufi perspective, the mystical dimension in Islam,
helped to spread Islam in Asia and Africa and created civilizing influences in
all fields. Since the 19th century, the influence of a narrower and
more legalistic vision of Islam has made political power the most central
element in religious discourse and struggle, and has denuded the comprehensive
sufi ethical narratives and denigrated a whole tradition of spiritual
luminaries. Since then, the
philosophical and curricular orientation of traditional Muslim education has
indicated a much heavier bent towards the legal and political aspects of Islam.
The sciences of tafsir, hadith, and jurisprudence and their major scholars and
figures have been rightly venerated, but at the expense of the sciences and the
scholars of theology and intellectual Sufism. Since in Islamic intellectual
history, most scholars were multi-dimensional and were authoritative in many
different fields, the rejection of theological and sufi scholars entails also
the denuding of works on tafsir, hadith and jurisprudence contributed by
theologians and sufis such as Abu Hamid al-Ghazzali (d. 1111), Muhyiddin Ibn
Arabi (d.1240), Jalaluddin Rumi (d.1273) etc. These trends have excluded even
the Asha’arites and all the Sufis from the category of the Sunni community
which, to them consists only of the Hanbalites and the scholars of hadith,
after the three generations of pious ancestors after the Prophet Muhammad.[4]
In conjunction with these trends, the key
term which comprehensively reflects the Islamic concept of education, ta’dib, which was traditionally used by
all Muslims, especially the Sufis, was dropped out of currency and replaced
exclusively by ta’lim (instruction)
and tarbiyyah (training). Increasingly, we also notice that scholars and
writers such as Ahmad ibn Hanbal (d.855 CE), Ibn Taymiyah (1328), Said Qutb
(1966), Abu A’la Maududi (1979), who suffered physical sufferings from
political leaders, were given greater authority and a more elevated status than
others. It needs to be said though, that
Ibn Taymiyah and especially Ibn Hanbal were highly prominent traditional
scholars were not politically partisan, whereas Said Qutb and Maududi were self
educated Islamic writers and key members of politically interested Islamic
orgaizations. The fundamental agenda of these groups, such as al-Qaedah, Jamaah
Islamiah, Darul Islam Nusantara and Hizbu Tahrir is to re-establish the global
Caliphate and to set-up idealized transnational Islamic states. Hizbut Tahrir,
for example does have a large following in Indonesia, and a much smaller one in
Malaysia.[5]
The trends cited above are also a response to the gradual but effective
secularization of Muslim governing elites in most parts of the Muslim world.
These leaders, with their secular personalities and ineffective socio-economic
policies, have created disillusionment among the population on modern political
experiments and on the positive elements of modernity. State appointed religious authorities are
perceived to be fettered by an executive branch, many of whom are influenced by
Western liberal ideas, and who are not respected by the more serious minded
among the Muslim masses. Truly
independent-minded and traditionally moderate religious scholars are sidelined
both by Muslim governing elites and non-Muslim supporters at home and
abroad. The almost total rejection of
the modern nation state and the extremists’ calls to “return to Islam” through
the establishment of an idealized Islamic state and total implementation of the
Shariah, are also intricately linked to these developments. The increase in democratic space in the
post-Suharto Indonesia and in Malaysia can be misused by small independent
extremist Muslim groups to exercise the Islamic commands of jihad and amar ma’ruf nahy mungkar (commanding
good forbidding evil), and to express the solidarity of Muslim brotherhood.
These are shown by fighting against the allegedly anti-Islamic Western nations
and their institutions, disrupting entertainment, gambling and prostitution
outlets, and attacking aggressive non-Muslim groups and religious
establishments perceived to be aggressively against Islam.[6]
Under the present circumstances,
non-Muslims, whether in the West or the East, seem to measure the moderateness
of Muslims with the latter’s affinity with the secular and western worldview
and ethical orientations. In most
conferences and dialogues, most of the “moderate” Muslim scholars and leaders,
men and women invited to participate therein are mostly secularized and
Westernized, the traditional attire not-withstanding. These “moderates” —who
don’t really represent the majority Muslim religious view---would regularly
receive various financial and socio-political support from non-Muslim leaders
and institutions. This would further confirm the long-standing mistrust among
the majority of Muslims that non-Muslims, especially those in the West, have an
agenda of trying to subvert Islam, to mold it into their own image, and to
westernize it. Dialogues between such Muslim “moderates” with their non-Muslim
and Western counterparts are thus not reaching the target audience—and instead,
have derailed their noble objectives, while alienating and radicalizing
previously moderate Muslims.
Inter-faith and inter-civilizational
dialogues can be helpful to promote mutual understanding, compassion and
benevolence. Similarities, wherever they exist, must be emphasized. But it is
clear to me that the greatest challenge is not to force an artificial unity
amidst fundamental and meaningful differences because this will lead to
radicalism among those who feel that the truly distinguishing aspects of their
legion, culture and identity have not been properly recognized and acknowledged
as such, but are forced through a prism of another, and more dominating
worldview. The greater challenge, and a more honest one, is to recognize and
admit these differences and to place them accordingly. Reality, as aptly
observed by Syed Muhammad Naquib al-Attas, is difference, and knowledge of a
thing is possible because of its distinguishing characteristic(s) from others.
Justice is attained when we are able to recognize this and to ensure that
everything is put in their right and proper places (al-Attas 2001).
The
right and proper place of some matters are determined primarily by a just
implementation of a legal system while of some other matters they are decided
by a proper understanding and right application of the historical, moral, and
religious traditions of a people. Oppression, barbaric acts, and injustices
have been carried out against fellow humans because of the inability to justly
treat the differences between us.
Suggestions and
Conclusion
To contain Muslim radicalism, both the
external and internal factors must be seriously and urgently addressed, and
with sincerity. While radicalism and extremism are not only religious in
nature, but also tribal and secular, religious leaders and institutions can
play an effective role in minimizing conflicts that not only involve religious
issues but also, and more importantly, involving non-religious matters.
I would like to offer the following
suggestions without, in any way, pretending to be original.
- Internal
reform of Muslim religious education should be of utmost priority,
concentrating first at the higher levels, especially the madrassah and the university. This
reform can be done by re-traditionalizing Islamic education and
re-introducing proper Sufi narratives and ethical discourse by
authoritative and traditionally moderate scholars representing their
Community, and who may be critical of certain secular and Western ideas
and institutions. Subjects dealing
with modern humanities, including comparative religion should be
introduced. A very good example where many aspects of this proposal were
successfully carried out was the International Institute of Islamic
Thought and Civilization (ISTAC) Kuala Lumpur during the leadership of
Syed Muhammad Naquib al-Attas.[7]
Westernizing or liberalizing traditional Islamic education will be
counter-productive (Blanchard 2007; US Agency for International
Development (USAID) 2003).[8]
- The
establishment of a more just and transparent leadership and governance,
who are not perceived to be Western stooges. The West’s persistent support
for political leaders who are widely perceived as unjust and corrupt will
increase support for Muslim extremists and radicals.
- Permanent
peace in the Middle East, especially in Palestine and Iraq, must be
urgently achieved. Muslims and Arabs must accept the right of Israel to
exist and prosper within the boundaries determined by the UN; but Israel
and the international community should help with the restorative and other
forms of compensation for the Palestinian people to live and prosper with
meaningful independence (BADIL Resource Center for Palestinian Residency
and Refugee Rights 2008).[9]
- A
similarly permanent solution to the problems of indigenous Muslim
minorities must be found. They should be made to understand that they must
live under current national governments—but meaningful autonomy should be
granted. Their religious, linguistic, and cultural identity should be
protected, and their
socio-economic opportunities should be enhanced. The economic costs to carry out these
and the above suggestions are certainly high but the alternatives have
been proven to be worse on all fronts: economic, social, and the security
of the region and the world. Consider for example the financial costs of
the Iraq war and the war on terror on the US alone. On June 30, 2008, US
Congress has approved a total of about USD$864 billion to cover all
military operations, base security, reconstruction, foreign aid, embassy
costs, and veterans’ health for the War in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere
since 9/11 2001 till part of FY2009, and which is estimated to increase to
USD 1.3 or 1.7 trillion by FY2018 depending on troop levels (Belasco
2008).
- Migrant
Muslim communities in Asia and elsewhere should be given due rights like
others. They must recognize the true responsibilities within the new
nation-states and contribute their utmost to be the moral and
socio-economic strengths of the nation.
British government’s reported sanctioning of shariah judges in the
currently five Muslim courts to rule on family law as well as financial
disputes with the full power of the British judicial system, through the
county courts or the High Court, if indeed true, is a very positive development.[10]
- The
international community should be more consistent in their efforts to
promote international peace, inter-religious tolerance, and prosperity of
the human race, as much as humanly possible. Demonizing Islam and Muslims
because of the faults of an extremely small number, while conveniently
ignoring or glossing over the more serious atrocities against Muslims and
others by other religious, secular or tribal entities will only breed a
larger number of Muslim extremists and radicals worldwide and make many
Muslims less supportive of the international community’s peaceful
endeavors.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Al-Attas,
S.M.N. 1986. A Commentary on the Hujjat
al-Siddiq of Nur al-Din al-Raniri. Kuala Lumpur: Ministry of Culture.
_____________.
2001. Prolegomena to the Metaphysics of
Islam: An Exposition on the Fundamental Elements of the Worldview of Islam.
Kuala Lumpur: ISTAC.
_____________.
1988. The Oldest Known Malay Manuscript:
The 16th Century Malay Translation of the Aqa’id of al-Nasafi.
Kuala Lumpur: University of Malaya.
Blanchard,
Christopher M. 2007. Islamic Religious
Schools, Madrassa: Background. CRS Report for Congress. Order code RS
21654.
Amy
Belasco. 2008. The Cost of Iraq,
Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11. CRS
Report for Congress.
Endang
Turmudi and Riza Sihbudi (Eds). 2005. Islam
dan Radikalisme di Indonesia. Jakarta:
Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia.
Kamaruzzaman
Yusoff et. al, Persepsi Masyarakat Islam
Tentang Radikalisme di Malaysia. National University of Malaysia. IRPA
Projek 0702020029 EA 263.
M.Musa
Jaafar. 2008. Tarbiyah Jihadiyah Sumber
Ideologi Salafiyah Jihadiyah di Malaysia. Unpublished MA Thesis. Faculty of
Social Sciences and Humanities, National University of Malaysia, Bangi.
Tibbi,
B. 2006. Jihadism as a Religious Legitimation of Terrorism in the path of God:
Irregular War and Post-Bipolar Security. In Mustafa Aydin & Kostas Ifantis
(eds.), International Security:
Understanding Change and Debating Strategy. Ankara: Center For Strategic
Research. pp 70-74
Tim
Ulin Nuha Maahad Aliy. 2003. Dirasatul
Firaq: Kajian Tentang Aliran-aliran Sesat dalam Islam. Solo/Surakarta:
Pustaka Arafah/ Pustaka Ulin Nuha.
US
Agency for International Development (USAID). 2003. Strengthening Education in the Muslim World. USAID Issue Paper.
Wan
Mohd Nor Wan Daud. 1998. The Educational
Philosophy and Practice of Syed Muhammad Naquib al-Attas: An Exposition of the
Original Concept of Islamization. Kuala Lumpur: ISTAC.
_____________________.
2003. Budaya Ilmu: Satu Penjelasan.
Singapore: Pustaka Nasional.
Wan
Mohd Nor Wan Daud and Khalif Muammar. 2009. Kerangka Komprehensif Pemikiran
Melayu Abad ke 17 Masehi berdasarkan manuskrip Durr al-Fara’id karangan Sheikh
Nuruddin al-Raniri, Sari 27: 119-146.
Zainuddin
Fananie, Atiqa Sabardila and Dwi Purnanto. 2002. Radikalisme
Keagamaan dan Perubahan Sosial. Surakarta: Muhammadiyah University Press
and the Asia Foundation.
AFP
Sept 2007
The
Times, London, 22nd Sept 2008
The Times,
London 14 Sept 2008
The Times London
Oct 31, 2008
The Star, 26th
Sept 2008.
Internet:
www.oic-oci.org/oicnews/is11/english/Islamophobia-rep-en.pdf.
OIC Observatory Report on Islamophobia-May 2007-March 2008.
www.GlobalSecurity.org.
Accessed on 24 Sept 2008
1.This paper has been previously
published in Sari: International Journal
of the Malay World and Civilization, National University of Malaysia (UKM)
vol 28, no 1, June 2010, pp.
241-252. It is a slight correction of
the one was presented at the Seminar on
Islam and Asia: Revisiting the Socio-Political Dimension of Islam, jointly organized by in Tokyo by Japan
Institute of International Affairs (JIIA) and Institute of Islamic
Understanding Malaysia (IKIM), 15-16 October 2008. I wish to thank Hisham A
Helyer, Fellow
Centre for Research in Ethnic Relations (CRER), University of Warwick, UK for his critical comments.
Centre for Research in Ethnic Relations (CRER), University of Warwick, UK for his critical comments.
[2] The earliest extant Malay
manuscript is the Malay translation of the Aqa’id of al-Nasafi dated 1590 CE
while Malay commentary on it---Durr
al-Fara’id bi Sharh al-‘Aqa’id--- was accomplished by Nur al-Din al-Raniri
in 1631CE which was widely copied throughout the Malay Archipelago. See Syed
Muhammad Naquib al-Attas, The Oldest
Known Malay Manuscript: The 16th Century Malay Translation of the
Aqa’id of al-Nasafi (Kuala Lumpur: University of Malaya, 1988). Between August-December
2008, we found several copies of al-Raniri’s manuscript, only four of which are
complete. See Wan Mohd Nor Wan Daud and Khalif Muammar, “Kerangka Komprehensif
Pemikiran Melayu Abad ke 17 Masehi berdasarkan manuskrip Durr al-Fara’id
karangan Sheikh Nuruddin al-Raniri”, Sari.
International Journal of the Malay World and Civilization, vol 27, no 2 Dec
2009.
[3] The Star, 26th Sept 2008. See
1st OIC Observatory Report on Islamophobia-May 2007-March 2008. www.oic-oci.org/oicnews/is11/english/Islamophobia-rep-en.pdf.
[4] See, for example, a very popular
book published by one religious school in Surakarta, Indonesia, Tim Ulin Nuha
Maahad Aliy, Dirasatul Firaq: Kajian
Tentang Aliran-aliran Sesat dalam Islam (Solo/Surakarta: Pustaka Arafah/
Pustaka Ulin Nuha, 2003. For a study of Muslim perceptions on radicalism in
Malaysia 2004-2006, see Kamaruzzaman Yusoff et. al, Persepsi Masyarakat Islam Tentang Radikalisme di Malaysia. National
University of Malaysia. IRPA Projek 0702020029 EA 263.
[5] M.Musa bin Jaafar, “Tarbiyah
Jihadiyah Sumber Ideologi Salafiyah Jihadiyah di Malaysia”. Unpublished MA Thesis.
Faculty of Social Sciences and Humanities, National University of Malaysia,
Bangi. 2008. pp. 112-115. pp.78-93. M. Musa was a staff of Royal Malaysian
Police Force at Bukit Aman, Kuala Lumpur.
[6]For studies on these activities
in Indonesia, see Zainuddin Fananie, Atiqa Sabardila and Dwi Purnanto , Radikalisme
Keagamaan dan Perubahan Sosial. Surakarta: Muhammadiyah University Press
and the Asia Foundation, 2002; Endang Turmudi and Riza Sihbudi, eds. Islam dan Radikalisme di Indonesia.
Jakarta: Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan
Indonesia, 2005; on the activities of one such group Malaysia such as the now
defunct Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia (KMM), see M.Musa bin Jaafar, Tarbiyah Jihadiyah Sumber Ideologi Salafiyah
Jihadiyah di Malaysia. Unpublished MA Thesis. Faculty of Social Sciences
and Humanities, National University of Malaysia, Bangi. 2008. pp. 112-115.
[7]
See Wan Mohd Nor Wan Daud, The
Educational Philosophy and Practice of Syed Muhammad Naquib al-Attas: An
Exposition of the Original Concept of Islamization (Kuala Lumpur: ISTAC,
1998); idem, Budaya Ilmu: Satu Penjelasan
(Singapore: Pustaka Nasional, 2003).
[8]
See Christopher M Blanchard. Islamic
Religious Schools, Madrassa: Background. CRS Report for Congress. Order
code RS 21654. Updated January 23, 2007; also US Agency for International
Development (USAID). Strengthening
Education in the Muslim World. USAID Issue Paper. No 2 June 2003
[9] For a more elaborate discussion
on the various UN Resolutions pertaining to the rights of Palestinian refugees
and on the compensation for various losses, see BADIL Resource Center for
Palestinian Residency and Refugee Rights. http.badil.org/solutions/text01-text
03.htm. access on 9/16/2008.
[10] Times (London) 14 Sept 2008.
However, Jack Straw the Justice Secretary, stressed that Sharia law should not
be made a separate system in the UK, and that its provisions should not
conflict with English law. (Times (London) Oct 31, 2008.).
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